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Abstract
With the growing use of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) in health workforce re-
search, the reliability of elicited job preferences is a growing concern. We provide the
first empirical evidence on the temporal stability of such preferences, using a unique lon-
gitudinal survey of Australian nursing students and graduate nurses. The respondents
completed DCEs on nursing positions in two survey waves. Each position is described
by salary and eleven non-salary attributes, and the two waves are spaced 15 months
apart on average. Between the waves, most final-year students finished their degrees
and started out as graduate nurses. Thus, the survey covers a long timespan that in-
cludes an important period of career transition. The relative importance of different
job attributes appears stable enough to support the use of DCEs to identify key areas
of policy intervention. There is virtually no change in the groupings of influential job
characteristics. Conclusions regarding the stability of willingness-to-pay, however, are
different due to unstable preferences for salary. The instability of preferences for salary
was also found previously in the context of comparing alternative elicitation methods.
This prompts us to push for further work on the reliability of stated preferences over
monetary attributes.
2
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing demand for empirical evidence to guide the re-
cruitment and retention of health care professionals. Household surveys and registry
data, however, do not often provide rich enough information to analyse trade-offs across
a wide range of job attributes. A growing body of evidence comes from discrete choice
experiments (DCEs), with the World Health Organization and the World Bank now
promoting the DCE approach (Ryan et al., 2012; Arau´jo and Maeda, 2013). This ap-
proach collects stated choices among job profiles to elicit preferences for job attributes.
The Australian DCE study of Doiron et al. (2014), for example, is the first study from
a developed country to provide evidence on trade-offs across several nursing job at-
tributes, which have not been previously analysed together due to data limitations.
Other recent DCE studies include Kolstad (2011) on Tanzanian clinical officers, Sivey
et al. (2012) on Australian doctors, and Holte et al. (2015) on Norwegian doctors.
The usefulness of DCE studies depends on whether they capture fundamental as-
pects of preferences which can inform future decisions, making temporal stability an
important reliability criterion. A handful of studies have tested for temporal stabil-
ity explicitly. Earlier studies find stable preferences for medical services (Bryan et al.,
2000; San Miguel et al., 2002; Salkeld et al., 2005; Skjoldborg et al., 2009) and social
care outcomes (Ryan et al., 2006) but, as Liebe et al. (2012) point out, their study de-
signs may be conducive to carry-over effects since the repeat DCE occurs soon (2 weeks
to 4 months) after the initial DCE. Recent studies in environmental valuation suggest
that the timespan between DCEs indeed matters. Two six-month studies (Czajkowski
et al., 2014; Rigby et al., 2015) support stability, while two one-year studies (Liebe
et al., 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2014) present mixed evidence. The marketing study of
Islam and Louviere (2015) on household consumables (e.g. toothpastes), however, finds
that stability may hold over two years when DCE profiles describe familiar objects.
This paper is the first DCE study to investigate the temporal stability of stated job
preferences. Exploring temporal stability over a long timespan is important in health
workforce research, where DCEs often recruit prospective workforce cohorts to aid
forward-looking policy formulation. For instance, Blauuw et al. (2010), Kolstad (2011),
and Holte et al. (2015) administer DCEs involving entry-level positions to students of
professional degree programmes, and Sivey et al. (2012) and Pedersen and Gyrd-Hansen
(2014) administer DCEs involving specialist positions to non-specialist doctors. While
prospective and current employees often have opportunities to experience various job
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attributes, job decisions are inherently more complex than the purchase of household
consumables. Assuming temporal stability over a long period without relevant evidence
may lead to erroneous policy decisions, especially when the period in question involves
career transition. As Islam and Louviere (2015) review, behavioural and psychological
research contends that preferences encompass constructed, as opposed to inherently
stable, components that vary with external conditions. Qualitative research findings
show that the health workers’ assessment of job aspects varies within a few months into
the first employment (Kelly and Ahern, 2009), suggesting that career transition may be
one such condition. Whether job preferences remain stable, and if not, to what extent
instability alters conclusions from an initial DCE, are questions that need be addressed
empirically.
We analyse a longitudinal survey of nursing students and junior nurses who com-
pleted two waves of DCEs involving entry-level nursing positions in Australia.1 The
two waves were spaced at least a full year apart and 15 months on average, meaning
that our study covers a longer timespan than all but one previous study (Islam and
Louviere, 2015). Many of our respondents are making the transition from study to
work, potentially learning a lot about performing nursing jobs.
2 Data and methods
The underlying survey recruited 628 respondents during 2008-2010, from 3-year Bache-
lor of Nursing programmes at the University of Technology Sydney and the University
of New England in Australia.2 This paper focuses on 241 respondents who participated
in DCEs involving entry-level nursing jobs in two consecutive waves.3 They completed
the first-wave DCE between September 2009 and July 2011, when 27%, 32% and 41%
of them were third-year, second-year and first-year students; and the second-wave DCE
between April 2011 and August 2012, when 35% of them were graduate nurses, while
34%, 29% and 2% were third-year, second-year and first-year students. Each respon-
dent’s completion dates were spaced at least a full year apart, and 15 months on average.
The first-wave DCE requires each respondent to complete 8 choice scenarios. Each
scenario asks for the best and the worst out of 3 jobs simultaneously, thereby eliciting a
1Doiron et al. (2014) provide an in-depth analysis of the first wave of the survey.
2More information on this survey is available in Yoo and Doiron (2013) and Doiron et al. (2014).
3An earlier version of this paper provides a multinomial logit analysis of the current estimation
sample, as well as an unbalanced sample that includes all 628 first-wave respondents. That version
can be accessed at: https://goo.gl/TFiSgJ.
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full preference ordering. The jobs are differentiated by weekly salary (four possible lev-
els) and 11 non-salary attributes (two possible levels each): the online appendix provides
details on the attribute-levels. The second-wave DCE is identical, barring two differ-
ences. First, the four underlying salary levels change from {$800, $950, $1100, $1250}
to {$900, $1100, $1300, $1500}, mirroring the updated pay scale for entry-level nursing
jobs in 2011. Second, the respondents are not required to complete all 8 scenarios,
although almost everyone (234 out of 241) voluntarily completed all.
Most DCEs prompt choices from available alternatives, instead of full preference
orderings.4 To obtain more directly comparable results, we focus on modelling which
of 3 jobs is the best. In the random utility maximisation framework, the chosen and
best alternatives are conceptually equivalent, since the decision maker is assumed to
choose their best alternative. Capparos et al. (2008) and Akaichi et al. (2013) test this
equivalence by administering the same DCE using both elicitation formats, and find
supporting evidence.
Our analysis follows the usual random utility maximisation framework. The utility
that person n derives from job j in choice senario t is
Unjt = β
′
ntxnjt + εnjt (1)
where βnt = αn + δn × wave2nt.
xnjt is a vector of 12 attributes, βnt is a conformable vector of utility coefficients,
wave2nt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for choice scenarios from wave 2, and error
term εnjt is i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value. βnt comprises αn that captures the baseline
preferences in wave 1, and δn that captures the deviations from the baseline in wave
2. We accommodate interpersonal taste heterogeneity nonparametrically by specifying
a finite-mixture or “latent class” logit (LCL) model (Train, 2008): θn = (αn, δn) can
be one of C classes or types of preferences, θ1,θ2, · · · ,θC , with the population share
of class c being Pr(θn = θc) = pic.
5 Our discussion focuses on the 3-class LCL model
that estimates θ1,θ2,θ3, pi1, and pi2, normalising pi3 = 1− pi2 − pi1.6
4To our best knowledge, Islam and Louviere (2015) is the only temporal stability study that models
best-worst choices.
5The online appendix reports results based on other types of mixed logit models.
6The preferred number of classes C is often selected using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
In our application, BIC for the 3-class model is 6260, compared to 6281 for the 2-class model and 6325
for the 4-class model.
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All non-salary attributes are dummy-coded. Salary is log-transformed to allow for
the diminishing marginal utility of money.7
3 Results
Figure 1 plots the second wave (W2) coefficients against the first wave (W1) coefficients.
They are the population mean utility weights, E(αn + δn) =
∑3
c=1 pic(αc + δc) in W2
and E(αn) =
∑3
c=1 picαc in W1. To facilitate interpretation, we multiply the coefficient
on ln(salary) by ln(1.6), and plot the resulting utility weight on 60% extra salary: in
W1 (W2), the largest salary level of $1250 ($1500) is 56% (67%) above the base level
of $800 ($900).
Most coefficients are clustered around the 45◦ line, implying similar magnitudes over
time. Some show marked deviations from it, however, especially the weights on better
hospital equipment and 60% extra salary. Statistically, 5 out of 12 coefficients show
significant changes, including these two. As environmental valuation studies with the
longest timespan (Liebe et al., 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2014), we find evidence against
the complete stability of utility weights.
The relative valuation of job aspects, nevertheless, seems stable enough to allow
its use in identifying the priority areas of intervention. Whether Figure 1 is read
horizontally or vertically, attribute labels are encountered in a similar order, implying
a similar relative valuation over time. The magnitude-based rankings of the coefficients
in Table 1, indeed, show that 8 of 12 attributes display no or one-place change in
rankings. The composition of four groups of three attributes based on W1 rankings
remains unchanged in W2, except “well equipped” and “well staffed” that swap their
membership in the 4th-6th place group and the 7th-9th place group. The results are
particularly impressive considering that consistently trading off 12 attributes across 3
jobs is a non-trivial task.8
All money metric measures of better non-salary attributes can be expected to be
influenced by the marked decline in the utility of extra salary in Figure 1. We consider
7The log transformation also adjusts for general price variations over person-specific completion
dates. Any price deflator drops out from differences in the log of deflated salary within a choice set.
8Most other DCEs in health workforce research specify 7 attributes or less, albeit they tend to be
more complex than ours in another dimension by specifying more than 2 levels per non-salary attribute:
see for example Sivey et al. (2012) and Holte et al. (2015). Given the results on the effects of complexity
found in DCEs involving health insurance (Barnes et al., 2015) and environmental valuation (DeShazo
and Fermo, 2002), we speculate that the stable relative valuation of job aspects can be generalised to
health workforce DCEs involving fewer attributes than ours.
6
Figure 1: Wave-specific mean coefficients
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The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241 individuals. LogL (param) refers to the max-
imised log-likelihood (number of estimated parameters). The W1 coefficient on “abundant parking”
is insignificant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 1% level. A hollow circle
indicates a significant between-wave difference at the 5% level. The base level for “public hospital”
is “private hospital”. Other non-salary attributes are vertical attributes and their base levels can
be easily inferred. See the online appendix for further information on attribute-levels and detailed
estimation results.
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Table 1: Mean coefficients and magnitude rankings
LCL Mean Coefficient Ranking
W1 W2 W2−W1 W1 W2 W2−W1
supportive management 1.400*** 1.168*** −0.232** 1 1 0
60% up in salary 1.201*** 0.914*** −0.287** 2 3 +1
excellent quality of care 1.156*** 0.992*** −0.164 3 2 −1
flexible rostering 0.727*** 0.625*** −0.102 4 6 +2
well equipped 0.673*** 0.384*** −0.289*** 5 8 +3
encourage prof. development 0.643*** 0.685*** +0.042 6 5 −1
appropriate responsibility 0.609*** 0.459*** −0.150 7 7 0
well staffed 0.492*** 0.689*** +0.197** 8 4 −4
public hospital 0.461*** 0.383*** +0.078 9 9 0
3 rotations 0.312*** 0.311*** −0.001 10 10 0
flexible work hours 0.186*** 0.227*** +0.041 11 12 +1
abundant parking 0.102 0.306*** +0.204** 12 11 −1
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. W1 and W2 stand for
Wave 1 and Wave 2 respectively. Ranking refers to the rankings of the LCL mean coefficients in terms
of magnitude.
the willingness-to-pay (WTP) or a fraction of salary that person n is willing to give
up for an improvement in attribute k. The WTP equals 1 − exp(−θnk/θnS), given
coefficients θnk on attribute k and θnS on ln(salary).
9 In the LCL model, the population
mean WTP (MWTP) is obtained by averaging class-specific WTP using class shares
as weights.
Figure 2 reports MWTP in each wave. We also compute MWTP for a counterfactual
case that combines θnk from W2 and θnS from W1. As expected, MWTP in W2 tends
to exceed MWTP in W1. But MWTP in the counterfactual case shows much less
pronounced deviations, and suggest that the instability in MWTP is driven primarily by
the declining utility of extra salary. Schaafsma et al. (2014) define the average transfer
error of MWTP as the average percentage change in MWTP between waves. Our
average transfer error is 59% between W2 and W1, and 11% between the counterfactual
case and W1. The latter compares well against -35% in Schaafsma et al. (2014). Our
own computation for other studies reporting MWTP finds 23% in Liebe et al. (2012),
whose study rejected the temporal stability of utility weights as Schaafsma et al. did,
9This expression corresponds to 1− λ , where λ solves θnk + θnS ln(λ× salary) = θnS ln(salary).
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Figure 2: Mean willingness-to-pay (WTP)
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The WTP refers to the fraction of salary that the decision maker is willing to trade off for an improve-
ment in a particular attribute. Figures in the brackets, (A,B,C) indicate that the mean WTP in wave
1 is A; the mean WTP in the counterfactual case, that uses wave 2 non-salary coefficients and wave 1
salary coefficients, differs from A by B; and the actual mean WTP in wave 2 differs from A by C.
and -36% in Skjoldborg et al. (2009) and 4% in Czajkowski et al. (2014) whose studies
did not.10,11
In sum, the average transfer error in MWTP for nursing job attributes would have
been towards the lower end of what previous studies have found for other types of
attributes, if not for the instability of preferences for salary. Before concluding, we
provide further thoughts on this instability.
To ensure that the declining utility of extra salary is a feature of the underlying data,
not that of our ln(salary) specification, a robustness check is performed. We modify
10Skjoldborg et al. (2009) and Czajkowski et al. (2014) conduct 3 DCEs over their study periods.
These results are based on their first and last DCEs.
11A modified version of the metric of Schaafsma et al. (2014) that averages the absolute values of
percentage changes instead of percentage changes leads to similar results.
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the LCL model above by replacing ln(salary) with 6 dummy variables (3 for each
wave) capturing all salary increments. The online appendix reports the results, which
show that a given amount of extra salary in W2 yields either the same or less utility
gain than a smaller amount in W1. The online appendix also reports specifications that
incorporate observed heterogeneity in utility weights using individual characteristics. In
general, the utility from extra salary and other attributes does not vary systematically
across career stage groups (graduates and different years of study). This may reflect a
good understanding of actual nursing jobs by students acquired through the practicum
component of the Bachelor of Nursing program, which lessens the possible influence of
career progression as an external shock to preferences. The hours spent in practicum
placements during the 3-year programme are substantial: 120 in year 1, 320 in year 2
and 400 in year 3.12
One obvious and potentially testable confounding factor is the “price vector effects”
(Hanley et al., 2005), which arise when elicited preferences are sensitive to the levels of
a monetary attribute used in the DCE design. As noted, four salary levels in our design
have increased for every respondent between W1 and W2, to keep the choice scenar-
ios plausible in relation to the updated pay schedule. Distinguishing the price vector
effects from the temporal shift in preferences for salary requires randomly allocating
respondents to two different salary vector treatments within the same wave; this would
be a useful avenue to pursue in future work.
If present, sizable price vector effects would have implications beyond explaining
the temporal instability of preferences for salary. Specifying a small number of salary
levels is a common feature of DCEs in health workforce research (e.g. Blaauw et al.
(2010), Kolstad (2011), and Sivey et al. (2012) consider four levels), and such effects
would limit the external validity of the resulting WTP estimates. Of three previous
studies that have tested for the price vector effects in the contexts of cervical cancer
screening (Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000) and environmental valuation (Hanley et al.
2005; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008), only one study (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008)
reports significant effects.
The findings of our earlier study (Yoo and Doiron, 2013) suggest that the robust
elicitation of preferences for salary could be an inherently difficult task. In that study,
we compare the DCE above against another type of DCE that presents respondents with
12Interestingly, first-year students, who spent the least time in practicum placements, are the only
group that differs from others in that first-year students place more weights on the hospital’s reputation
for excellent quality of care.
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only one nursing job profile at a time, asking them to state the best and worst aspects
of that particular job. The same respondents complete both types of DCEs which use
the same first-wave salary vector. Weights on non-salary attributes are comparable
across the two types of DCEs but again, the salary weights differ. These results, along
with the present analysis, prompt us to recommend further work on the stability of
preferences for monetary attributes generally.
4 Conclusion
This paper is the first study on the temporal stability of stated job preferences, an
important reliability criterion for the intended policy use of a growing number of DCE
studies in health workforce research. Statistically, we find stable preference parameters
for only 7 of 12 job attributes in our DCE. However, the relative importance of different
attributes to job choices is stable enough to support the use of DCEs to identify pri-
ority areas of intervention. Our conclusion regarding the stability of willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for non-salary attributes is more tentative. The average transfer error in our
WTP estimates is larger than what temporal stability studies in other contexts have
found. But this discrepancy is mostly explained by the instability of preferences for
salary: in the absence of it, the average transfer error is 11%, well within the lower end
of what other studies have found. We believe that a research agenda focusing on the
difficulty of eliciting preferences for monetary characteristics may be warranted.
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1 Supporting material for the main manuscript
Table A.1 provides a full summary of the attributes and levels used in the DCE design.
Table A.2 reports detailed estimation results for our main latent class logit (LCL) model
where weekly salary enters as ln(salary); Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1 in the main
manuscript are derived from these results.
2 Additional results: other mixed logit models
Our analytic framework is the usual random utility maximisation model. The utility
that person n derives from job j in choice scenario t is specified as
Unjt = β
′
ntxnjt + εnjt (1)
where βnt = αn + δn × wave2nt.
xnjt is a vector of 12 attributes, βnt is a conformable vector of utility coefficients,
wave2nt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for choice scenarios from wave 2, and error
term εnjt is i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value. βnt is further decomposed into αn that
captures the baseline preferences in wave 1, and δn that captures the deviations from
the baseline in wave 2.
The main manuscript focuses on the LCL model that uses a discrete distribution
to approximate the joint distribution of αn and δn nonparametrically.
1 In this section,
we present additional results based on other types of mixed logit models that place
more parametric restrictions on the joint distribution. Specifically, we estimate the
normal-mixture logit (NMIXL) model that specify βnt as
βnt = α+ δ × wave2nt + µn (2)
where α is a vector of mean utility coefficients in wave 1; α + δ is a vector of mean
utility coefficients in wave 2; and µn is a conformable vector of draws from a zero-mean
multivariate normal distribution, MVN(0,V ), that captures individual-specific devia-
tions from the population mean coefficients.2 The kth element of µn, µkn, then measures
by how much person n’s utility coefficient on the kth attribute deviates from the mean
1The estimation results have been obtained using Stata command -lclogit- (Pacifico and Yoo, 2013).
2The estimation results have been obtained using Stata command -mixlogit- (Hole, 2007).
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coefficient on that attribute, and the lth element µln can be interpreted similarly. The
kth diagonal element of V is the population variance of µkn, and indicates how dispersed
the taste for the kth attribute (as measured by the utility derived from that attribute)
is across individuals. The off-diagonal element in the kth row and the lth column of V
is identical to the element in the lth row and the kth column, as they correspond to
the population covariance of µkn and µln. A positive (negative) covariance means that
someone who derives a large utility from the kth attribute tends to derive a large (small)
utility from the lth attribute; in this sense, a non-zero covariance indicates correlated
tastes for two underlying attributes.
We also estimate the Generalized Multinomial Logit (GMNL) model of Fiebig et al.
(2010) that augments NMIXL with an additional random parameter σn to accommodate
interpersonal heterogeneity in the overall scale of utility. This model specify βnt as
βnt = σn(α+ δ × wave2nt + µn) (3)
where ln(σn) is a draw from a univariate normal distribution N(−0.5τ 2/, τ 2), and other
notations are the same as in the NMIXL context.3
The left panel of Figure A.1 plots the mean coefficients from an NMIXL specifica-
tion that assumes away correlated tastes for different attributes. This specification has
α, δ, and the diagonal elements of V as parameters to estimate, and constrains each
off-diagonal element of V to 0. The right panel of Figure A.1 plots the mean coeffi-
cients from a GMNL specification which extends the preceding NMIXL specification by
including τ as an additional parameter to estimate.
Similarly, the left panel of Figure A.2 plots the mean coefficients from an NMIXL
specification that allows for correlated tastes. This specification has α, δ, the diagonal
elements of V , and all distinct off-diagonal elements of V as parameters to estimate.
The right panel of Figure A.2 plots the mean coefficients from a GMNL specification
which extends this more general NMIXL specification by including τ as an additional
parameter to estimate.
In general, both figures look similar to Figure 1 in the main manuscript and suggest
that qualitatively the same pattern of temporal variations in the mean coefficients can be
detected regardless of which mixed logit model is used. While there are some differences
in relation to which specific coefficients show statistically significant variations, they do
not affect our main conclusion that a majority of the coefficients do not show significant
3The estimation results have been obtained using Stata command -gmnl- (Gu et al., 2013).
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variations; that the relative importance of different attributes remains fairly stable; and
that there is a substantial decline in the utility from extra salary which deserves further
research.
3 Additional results: dummy salary specification
As discussed in the main manuscript, the average transfer error in the mean willingness-
to-pay (MWTP) for nursing job attributes would have been towards the lower end of
what previous studies have found for other types of attributes, if not for the instability
of preferences for salary. To ensure that the declining utility of extra salary is a feature
of the underlying data, not that of our ln(salary) specification, we perform a robust-
ness check. Specifically, we modify our 3-class LCL model by replacing ln(salary) with
dummies for all salary increment levels in each wave, thereby making the model speci-
fication non-parametric with respect to salary gains. Figure A.3 plots the mean utility
weights from the resulting 3-class latent class logit (LCL) model. The weights on salary
gains are not directly comparable between waves, as salary changes by an increment
of $150 in W1, and $200 in W2. Nevertheless, Figure 3 clearly illustrates that a given
amount of extra salary in W2 yields either the same (on the 45◦ line) or less (below the
45◦ line) utility gains than a smaller amount in W1.
4 Additional results: demographic specifications
Our two DCE waves were spaced at least a full year apart, and 15 months on average.
By interacting each attribute with personal characteristics and using those interaction
terms as additional regressors, we can allow the utility coefficients to vary with personal
characteristics that vary between waves (e.g. stage of career), as well as time-invariant
(e.g. gender) characteristics. In case preferences vary systematically with time-varying
characteristics, it may be possible to explain some temporal shifts in preferences with
reference to changes in those characteristics between two waves.
Note, however, that since there are 12 attributes, incorporating one characteristic
requires estimating at least 12 extra parameters. Unless further restrictions are placed
on the selection of the demographic interaction terms, incorporating even a moder-
ately large number of characteristics can make the resulting specification susceptible to
overfitting and difficult to interpret and present.
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To achieve a parsimonious demographic specification, we followed a general-to-
specific specification search strategy. As it is computationally impractical to estimate
a mixed logit model repeatedly, our specification search was based on the multinomial
logit (MNL) model.4 We started off with a general MNL specification that involved
300 regressors: 12 attributes, 12 interaction terms between attributes and the wave 2
dummy, and 252 interaction terms involving attributes and 21 demographic variables.
These 21 demographic variables incorporate both time-varying and time-invariant per-
sonal characteristics.5 The general specification was estimated twice, once using the
balanced estimation sample of 241 respondents who completed the DCE in both waves
and provide 3821 choice observations, and once using the unbalanced sample that in-
cluded additional 387 respondents who only completed the first-wave DCE and provide
extra 3096 choice observations.6 Based on the results, we obtained a simplified spec-
ification that retained all 12 attributes and those out of 264 interaction terms which
were significant at the 10% level in either estimation sample. We then proceeded to
testing down the MNL model repeatedly in an analogous manner, by using a simplified
specification from one stage as a new general specification for the next stage, until we
obtained a specification wherein all retained interaction terms became significant at the
10% level in either estimation sample.
The resulting final MNL specification involves 28 regressors: 12 attributes, 4 inter-
action terms between attributes (ln(salary), “well staffed”, “well equipped”, “abundant
parking”) and the wave 2 dummy, and 12 demographic interaction terms. An earlier
version of this paper reports the MNL estimates based on this specification for both
balanced and unbalanced samples.7
The current main manuscript focuses on the analysis of temporal stability in prefer-
ences using the balanced sample. Accordingly, we modify the above final specification
4The estimation run time for our mixed logit models varied from 4 hours for the LCL model to 35
hours for the Correlated GMNL model in Figure A.2.
5The demographic variables covered: (1-3) career stage, captured by three dummies; (4) university
affiliation at the time of survey recruitment; (5) gender; (6-10) five dummies related to the respondent’s
current and planned parental status; (11) self-assessed health; (12) marital status; (13-14) two partner
characteristics (whether living with the respondent, whether employed); (15) satisfaction with current
nursing job if the respondent has one; (16-17) income and missing income flag; (18) whether born in
Australia; (19) whether international student; (20) whether English is native language; (21-24) four
age group dummies. More information is available upon request.
6The unbalanced sample, with more people, offers a greater scope for detecting observed hetero-
geneity of interest in this specification search process. Our main manuscript focuses on the balanced
sample, however, for ease of interpretation of the results as temporal shifts in preferences.
7The earlier version can be accessed at: https://goo.gl/bAkumy.
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further as follows. First, we drop 4 demographic interactions terms which are signifi-
cant in the unbalanced sample, but insignificant in the balanced sample.8 Second, we
include all 12 interaction terms between attributes and the wave 2 dummy, to facilitate
more direct comparisons with our baseline models that do not place any prior restric-
tion on which utility coefficient varies over time. The new MNL specification involves
32 regressors: 12 attributes, 12 interaction terms between attributes and the wave 2
dummy, and 8 demographic interaction terms.
Table A.3 reports the coefficient estimates from this last MNL specification, and the
mean coefficient estimates from its 3-class LCL model extension. Figure A.4 plots the
wave 2 estimates from each model against the corresponding wave 1 estimates, for the
reference group of respondents who are female, aged 22-29, not in first-year of university,
and have no children under 6. In general, conditioning on observed taste heterogeneity
through demographic interaction terms does not affect our baseline findings regarding
temporal stability, as all previously significant temporal variations except one remains
significant.9
That only a small number of demographic interaction terms turn out to be significant
is not uncommon in DCE studies, both in the context of health workforce research (Sivey
et al., 2012; Holte et al., 2015) and other contexts (Liebe et al., 2012; Schaafsma et al.,
2014). In the present context, however, the general lack of career stage (first-year,
second-year, third-year students and graduate nurses) effects may appear surprising if
one takes a view that job preferences would vary with job experiences, though our result
agrees with the findings of two previous temporal stability studies (San Miguel et al.,
2002; Liebe et al., 2012) which tested for the effects of relevant experiences in their
contexts and found no significant effects.10 We note that when 35 omitted interaction
terms involving attributes and career stage dummies are added to the MNL specification
8They are interaction terms involving: (1) “excellent quality of care” and “studied at the University
of New England” (base group: “studied at the University of Technology Sydney”); (2) “flexible ros-
tering” and “first-year students”; (3) “flexible rostering” and “male”; (4) “3 rotations” and “first-year
students”.
9In the baseline MNL model that excludes demographic heterogeneity, we found a significant change
in the utility weight on “excellent quality of care” that does not show up in Table A.3 and Figure A.4.
In the LCL model that excludes demographic heterogeneity (Figure 1 in the main manuscript), the
change in the mean utility weight on “supportive management” was significant at the 5% level; it is
now significant only at the 10% level.
10The alternatives in San Miguel et al. (2002) describe out-of-hours GP services, and the relevant
experience is whether the respondent used such a service between waves. The alternatives in Liebe
et al. (2012) describe landscape outcomes associated with wind power generation, and the relevant
experience is whether the respondent was exposed to wind power generation issues between waves.
6
in Table A.3 as additional regressors, the log-likelihood of the MNL model increases
only slightly to -3036.14 from -3050.96: the LR statistic of 29.64 has a χ2(35) p-value
of 0.72, and does not reject our current specification at any conventional significance
level. We offer two thoughts on the general lack of career stage effects. First, this may
suggest a good understanding of nursing jobs by nursing students acquired through
the practicum component of the Bachelor of Nursing program. The hours spent in
practicum placements during the 3-year programme are substantial: 120 in year 1,
320 in year 2 and 400 in year 3. Second, this may suggest that both experiences
and/or preference changes with experiences are individual-specific, instead of career
stage-specific. Note that the career stage interaction terms are only able to pick up
systematic variations in preferences across career stage groups.
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Figure A.1: Uncorrelated mixed logit: wave-specific mean coefficients
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The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241 individuals. LogL (param) refers to the max-
imised log-likelihood (number of estimated parameters). The log-likelihood has been simulated using
1000 random draws. A hollow circle indicates a significant between-wave difference at the 5% level.
Detailed estimation results are available upon request.
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Figure A.2: Correlated mixed logit: wave-specific mean coefficients
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The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241 individuals. LogL (param) refers to the max-
imised log-likelihood (number of estimated parameters). The log-likelihood has been simulated using
1000 random draws. A hollow circle indicates a significant between-wave difference at the 5% level.
Detailed estimation results are available upon request.
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Figure A.3: Wave-specific mean coefficients when specifying salary-level dummies
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The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241 individuals. Based on a 3-class latent class logit
model specification that replaces ln(salary) with three salary dummies per each wave. A hollow circle
(diamond) indicates a significant between-wave difference at the 5% level. A hollow square indicates
that the estimates are not comparable between waves. Detailed estimation results are available upon
request.
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Figure A.4: Demographic specifications: wave-specific (mean) coefficients
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The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241 individuals. LogL (param) refers to the max-
imised log-likelihood (number of estimated parameters). A hollow circle indicates a significant between-
wave difference at the 5% level. The results are for the reference group of respondents who are female,
aged 22-29, not in first-year of university, and have no children under 6. See Table A.3 for further
results.
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Table A.2: Latent class logit: main specification
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Mean
ln(salary) 4.477*** (0.465) 1.398*** (0.440) 1.839*** (0.467) 2.555*** (0.241)
int: *wave2 -0.679 (0.553) 0.406 (0.571) -1.496** (0.593) -0.611** (0.302)
supportive management 0.614*** (0.121) 2.418*** (0.294) 1.185*** (0.167) 1.400*** (0.103)
int: *wave2 -0.196 (0.168) -0.336 (0.322) -0.169 (0.210) -0.232** (0.117)
excellent quality of care 0.612*** (0.125) 0.747*** (0.143) 2.046*** (0.197) 1.156*** (0.083)
int: *wave2 -0.062 (0.174) -0.252 (0.193) -0.177 (0.258) -0.164 (0.100)
flexible rostering 0.927*** (0.133) 0.757*** (0.133) 0.511*** (0.143) 0.727*** (0.067)
int: *wave2 -0.259 (0.184) -0.251 (0.177) 0.186 (0.188) -0.101 (0.094)
encourage prof. dev. 0.524*** (0.115) 0.597*** (0.130) 0.797*** (0.145) 0.643*** (0.068)
int: *wave2 -0.235 (0.161) 0.378** (0.189) -0.014 (0.189) 0.042 (0.097)
approp. responsibility 0.153 (0.125) 0.891*** (0.172) 0.772*** (0.141) 0.609*** (0.077)
int: *wave2 0.370** (0.174) -0.503** (0.219) -0.306 (0.190) -0.150 (0.103)
well staffed 0.523*** (0.114) 0.514*** (0.137) 0.444*** (0.133) 0.492*** (0.065)
int: *wave2 0.239 (0.162) 0.182 (0.183) 0.170 (0.179) 0.196** (0.092)
well equipped 0.694*** (0.126) 0.672*** (0.218) 0.653*** (0.148) 0.673*** (0.081)
int: *wave2 -0.314* (0.180) -0.385 (0.252) -0.174 (0.194) -0.288*** (0.107)
public hospital 0.158 (0.121) 0.736*** (0.208) 0.487*** (0.134) 0.461*** (0.079)
int: *wave2 0.081 (0.164) -0.540** (0.267) 0.205 (0.179) -0.078 (0.107)
3 rotations 0.205* (0.121) 0.550*** (0.192) 0.189 (0.134) 0.312*** (0.079)
int: *wave2 0.117 (0.173) 0.001 (0.255) -0.114 (0.188) -0.001 (0.106)
flexible work hours 0.197* (0.115) 0.015 (0.116) 0.335** (0.133) 0.186*** (0.064)
int: *wave2 0.242 (0.166) -0.051 (0.165) -0.061 (0.182) 0.041 (0.089)
abundant parking 0.170 (0.114) 0.001 (0.120) 0.132 (0.124) 0.102 (0.063)
int: *wave2 0.307* (0.165) 0.154 (0.168) 0.154 (0.172) 0.204** (0.089)
Class Share 0.326*** (0.042) 0.325*** (0.043) 0.349*** (0.044)
log-likelihood -2927.24
estimated parameters 74
Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
int: is the interaction of the wave 2 dummy and the preceding job attribute. The model estimates
the coefficients on the job attributes and the interaction terms for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 (72
parameters in total); and the class shares for Class 1 and Class 2 (2 parameters in total). Other
results are derived from these 74 parameters. The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241
individuals.
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Table A.3: Demographic specifications
MNL LCL mean
ln(salary) 2.268*** (0.239) 2.342*** (0.252)
int: *wave2 -0.663*** (0.248) -0.612** (0.306)
int: *male 1.098** (0.503) 1.169** (0.489)
int: *born o/s 1.694*** (0.540) 1.552*** (0.557)
supportive management 1.201*** (0.080) 1.446*** (0.106)
int: *wave2 -0.145 (0.093) -0.253** (0.119)
excellent quality of care 0.859*** (0.086) 0.955*** (0.092)
int: *wave2 -0.004 (0.104) 0.055 (0.112)
int: *first-year 0.488*** (0.143) 0.571*** (0.145)
flexible rostering 0.666*** (0.069) 0.753*** (0.068)
int: *wave2 -0.125 (0.086) -0.108 (0.095)
encourage prof. development 0.582*** (0.069) 0.663*** (0.069)
int: *wave2 0.065 (0.086) 0.041 (0.098)
appropriate responsibility 0.496*** (0.068) 0.609*** (0.078)
int: *wave2 -0.067 (0.088) -0.150 (0.104)
well staffed 0.455*** (0.054) 0.501*** (0.065)
int: *wave2 0.160** (0.074) 0.200** (0.093)
well equipped 0.539*** (0.061) 0.699*** (0.083)
int: *wave2 -0.248*** (0.082) -0.298*** (0.109)
public hospital 0.381*** (0.067) 0.491*** (0.079)
int: *wave2 -0.052 (0.088) -0.088 (0.106)
3 rotations 0.247*** (0.061) 0.360*** (0.082)
int: *wave2 -0.003 (0.079) -0.010 (0.108)
int: *born o/s -0.372*** (0.135) -0.457** (0.192)
flexible work hours 0.136* (0.081) 0.179* (0.096)
int: *wave2 0.017 (0.074) 0.018 (0.092)
int: *aged ≤ 21 -0.189** (0.091) -0.179* (0.108)
int: *aged 30-39 0.072 (0.123) 0.081 (0.133)
int: *age ≥ 40 0.127 (0.153) 0.076 (0.153)
int: *has child under 6 0.581*** (0.162) 0.706*** (0.170)
abundant parking 0.072 (0.052) 0.110* (0.064)
int: *wave2 0.168** (0.077) 0.208** (0.090)
log-likelihood -3050.96 -2883.84
parameters 32 98
Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels. Int: is the interaction of the namesake dummy regressor and the preceding job attribute. The
base person is a female first-wave respondent aged 22-29, is not a first-year student, does not care
for a child under 6, and was born in or migrated to Australia 3 years before her enrollment at the
U. of Technology Sydney. MNL reports the coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit model.
LCL mean reports the mean coefficient estimates from the 3-class latent class logit model; detailed
estimation results are available upon request. The sample includes 3821 choice observations from 241
individuals.
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